Rotate Tapo camera credentials (bumble_cam/front_porch_camera) -- briefly exposed in a Claude Code session #81
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copper/ccnet-prod-devops#81
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Viseron's Tapo camera username/password (shared across both bumble_cam and front_porch_camera, per
secrets.yamlon Aegis) were briefly printed in plaintext in a Claude Code session transcript on 2026-09-17, during verification of a new go2rtc stream config (docker exec Viseron curl -s http://localhost:1984/api/streamsechoed back the full RTSP producer URLs with embedded basic-auth).Treat the credentials as compromised. Rotate:
secrets.yamlon Aegis (bumble_cam_username,bumble_cam_password,front_porch_camera_username,front_porch_camera_password, plus the two new whole-URL secretsbumble_cam_rtsp_url/front_porch_camera_rtsp_urladded the same day for go2rtc).See docs/homelab-architecture.md's Viseron section for the go2rtc/GPU work done in the same session where this happened.